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Authenticity is a diﬃcult and taxing notion in both the digital and the analogue world.
It is a retrospective and by implication dynamic notion, a reaction to whether or not
we are dealing with the genuine article, that an object is what it purports to be at a
moment in time and its content can be validated using available technology. It is not an
end in itself like a fresh herring, but a red herring which, because of the pungent smell
of the smokehouse, can put the hounds off the scent. Moreover it is not an absolute: an
object that might appear perfectly authentic from one perspective may be considered to
lack suﬃcient tokens of authenticity in another, and may later from both viewpoints be
considered invalid.
Content change may be captured in technologies, but does it necessarily follow that
the intellectual content remains the same? Revolutions in technology may change the
‘container’ (for example a card catalogue becomes a database), but how do such migrations
affect content and the procedures and practices that surround it? Is entering entities in
a database the same as ﬁlling in cards? Distribution channels have always inﬂuenced
structure and form without necessarily changing intellectual content or associated practice.
In addressing such issues we warn against the ever present danger of a collapse into
technological determinism with an accompanying utopian optimism [P. Flichy, The Internet
Imaginaire, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2007, Liz Carrey-Libbrecht. (trans.)].
We propose that discussion of identity needs to shift away from discussion of technologies
for preserving information towards characterisation of the persistent intellectual content.
In the migration to the digital we are especially concerned with four separate but related
issues of identity from this perspective:
• functionally identical replicas
• superﬁcially identical replicas
• similar objects
• earlier/later versions
We conclude that identity is not a technical issue: notions of identity, like authenticity,
are dynamic and have to deal with the non-transitive relations in stages of documents and
objects. We are convinced that only by adopting such a stance can any progress be made in
the sterile debate about digital preservation which logically must be downstream from the
resolution of notions of authenticity that themselves are reactive to issues of intellectual
content and available technology that following Aristotle we characterise as techné.
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Information objects serve a variety of purposes: as vehicles of communication, to seal agreements or contracts, for en-
tertainment, persuasion, education and as repositories of artistic or intellectual endeavour. As a result they can be expected
to have different characteristics. Any meaningful discussion of such objects therefore requires agreement as to which type
of object is being considered so that the notion of identity can be thoroughly explored. The notion of identity in this con-
text is important in relation to the sameness of such objects in time or place and also across the panoply of relationships
that such objects can have to one another. This paper, like most other information objects, has a range of relationships to
other papers, quoting from some, referring to others, agreeing with one, disagreeing with another and ﬁnally building on an
earlier paper in which we ﬁrst discussed the subject [1].
In trying to shed light on this area, we must consider why identity is important in an intellectual sense. Then we
need to separate this quest for identity from a simplistic consideration of the (mainly technical) means by which we can
determine objectively whether or not two information objects are the same. We soon discover that this task is by no means
straightforward, with notions of version, rendition and performance all nuancing identity.1 However, none of these notions
are new in the digital world; our starting point must be to consider how identity is understood in the analogue world and
then consider how migration to a digital world alters the way that we deal with the identity of information objects.
2. Content
The notion of content that we consider an object, text or event to contain or convey is neither singular nor immutable;
at least, this is the conception following a writer such as Barthes [3]. The polysemy, or plurality of meaning, advocated by
Barthes is a conception with which we have some sympathy, but which must be balanced by an exploration of the intention
of the author or creator which may or may not have implications in any future retrospective discussion of authenticity. We
can agree, for example that ‘The Haywain’ was painted by Constable, but we do not need to know what his intentions were
in creating the work in order to appreciate the painting; whereas if we are beneﬁciaries we are very keen to learn what
Aunt Gertrude intended when she left us her bantam cocks. On the other hand a third party reading Aunt Gertrude’s will
may have no interest in such intentionality and only be interested in the fact that by committing her soul to God with the
protection of the Blessed Virgin Mary and all the saints, she had Catholic tendencies.
As these trivial examples suggest, ‘content’ can refer to the meaning that something expresses, or to its information
content, or to the constituents of an individual’s experience at any given moment: for example, marvelling at ‘The Hay-
wain’ or being left bantam cocks. In the latter case the content is singular and ﬁxed, but it is also private, subjective and,
interestingly, immune from error through misidentiﬁcation [10,34]. I cannot be wrong about who it is who is having the
experience or, for that matter, what I believe to be the content of that experience, and what I believe to be the content of
my experience is of little public concern unless my content is such that I am moved to act on it in a bizarre or threatening
manner. It is with content as meaning and content as information that we are concerned in the context of objects that are
external though, of course, they cannot but relate to the individual’s experience for things have content in virtue of their
having a value of some sort for the experiencer or reader; ‘The Haywain’ would have no value if no one had ever seen it.
In his analysis of meaning or content Frege [13] distinguishes between the two ways in which an expression can have
signiﬁcance. The ﬁrst is its sense, the way in which the term or text refers to the object; also known as its ‘mode of
presentation’, which is to say, the thought that it expresses. The second is its reference, that is, the identiﬁer, proper name
or term used to refer to the object. So, if we take, for example, Mona Lisa, we have a term that refers, picks out, or identiﬁes
a particular work of art, but we also know that its a whole lot more than that. We might know, for example, that it refers
to a painting by Leonardo Da Vinci, that it was painted during the period now known as the Italian renaissance, that it has
the alternative title: “La Gioconda (La Joconde)”, or even that it has the title “Portrait of Lisa Gherardini, wife of Francesco
del Giocondo”, where it hangs in the Musée du Louvre in Paris, and so on. The name, the text or term, has many ways in
which it refers to the object and not just that it means Mona Lisa and nothing more. It is in Frege’s groundbreaking work
that we can begin to see Barthes’ polysemy take shape. As we have suggested, we do not need to know any of this reference
detail to appreciate the painting; a simple catalogue reference can suﬃce.
On the River Clyde ‘Ship No. 534 at the John Brown yard’ is just as an evocative reference as the Cunard liner’s name
Queen Mary. Such semantic reference conveys many more embedded concepts of identity than any amount of technical
detail, the size and weight of the ‘Mona Lisa’ or the Queen Mary. In much the same way the technical, as opposed to
semantic, attributes of digital objects may provide clues to provenance and any changes that may have occurred, but little
else. However, we would not wish to reject the latter in favour of the former; they both represent essential characteristics
in deﬁning the identity of the objects to which they refer. Setting the technical and the semantic up in a binary opposition
of this kind can be what forms the greatest obstacle to resolving the debates within the digital environment; one way out
of this morass would be to reconsider them within an Aristotelian framework of techné, pra¯xis, and epistêmê, where each is
employed alongside the other in an attempt to discover truth.
1 Between us we produced no fewer that 19 versions of this paper before we arrived at the version that you are reading.
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appropriate principles which have been acquired through experience. Techné is an art or technical skill: “the productive
state that is truly reasoned, while its contrary non-art [atechnia] is a productive state that is falsely reasoned” [2, 1140a1-23].
Thus, all activity, whether science or humanity is, ideally, both rational and productive. Pra¯xis, on the other hand, is to do
with purposive conduct, and most particularly with the exercise of phronesis or practical wisdom and the search for truth
(virtue) and falsity (vice) in relation to correct desire and, thus, (moral) action. Both techné and pra¯xis can be distinguished
from epistêmê which refers to the theoretical underpinning of scientiﬁc enquiry where “the object of scientiﬁc knowledge
is of necessity” [2, 113918-36], that is (controversially for our age and reason) there are no conditions under which it
could be otherwise. Aristotle’s favoured examples are taken from geometry, but there are many and they also include
medical and general science. So, if epistêmê directs itself towards the discovery of truth, techné to its production, and
pra¯xis to its employment, we can begin to see a way in which the technical and semantic should function together to be
truth-preserving, if not truth-determining. In this way we can begin to see how Heidegger and Foucault’s use of techné as
alêtheuein, or truth-framing, takes shape.
If we are to make progress we need, perhaps, to start looking in the direction of such mechanisms for what we could call
‘intellectual’ identity. What differences are ‘signiﬁcant’ in an intellectual sense as opposed to a purely technical sense? This
takes us nearer Heidegger and Foucault’s use of the word technology or techné to mean a mode of alêtheuein, by ‘enframing’;
‘It reveals whatever does not bring itself forth and does not yet lie here before us, whatever can look and turn out now one
way and now another’ [20]. Foucault argues that every technology implies a domain of knowledge and truth, and as a result
technology and power become inseparable. For McLuhan the medium itself becomes the message [25]. We may not wish to
go so far, but we will explore the complex relationship between technology and epistêmê in the digital world avoiding the
binary opposition between the technical and the semantic where, as we have suggested, much of the diﬃculty lies. Kuhn
coined the concept of a ‘paradigm shift’, much cited in the context of the information revolution [21], but ‘only rarely does
Kuhn recognise the crucial role a new piece of apparatus may play as the prelude’ to such an event [18, p. 46].
Such an approach refuses to privilege the technical because it is easy and ‘objective’ and appears to avoid diﬃcult
questions, but instead embraces the semantic and intellectual as well. In both the analogue and digital worlds, different
technologies can reveal different information from the same carrier.2 In a digital environment, if we take a technical only
view, it becomes very diﬃcult to deal with the migration of digital objects to different systems and technologies in any re-
liable way, except to make ever more unsupportable assertions about technical processes, such as increasing the complexity
of passwords, adoption of digital signatures, checksums, and so forth [16, p. 50], [39, p. 24] and leads to the approach of
Gladney who states that ‘Where information is cryptographically packaged together with its own provenance assertion, and
this evidence shows itself to be intact, a consumer can be conﬁdent that the information is authentic’ [15]. Let us take an
example of where this might fail—if a Microsoft Word ﬁle has been read into Open Oﬃce and saved as an OpenXML ﬁle, is
it the same abstract object? There are a number of issues even in this rather trivial example:
• there may be features of the layout that are not faithfully migrated and which are an important part of the intellectual
identity of the object; for example in George Herbert’s poem ‘Easter Wings’ of 1633,3 layout is arguably as important as
the words used, or in the case of the Mona Lisa the size, shape and texture are critical and can hardly be replicated on
a biscuit tin let alone on screen.
• there may be behaviours coded in macros that, under the translation, work quite differently (or not at all), in the same
way as brush strokes or the texture of parchment vanish or are transformed in digital renditions.
• the ﬁle may not be completely self contained in either environment and rely on system settings that do not form part
of the transformation or an explicit part of the ﬁle in either case. The conversion process is analogous to tearing a
physical object from its intended setting, for example the removal of the ‘Elgin Marbles’ from the Parthenon.
3. Binding and its importance
In the analogue, the identity of any documentary object and its place in a collection is warranted by attributes that can
be characterised as bindings that will vary depending on the ‘value’ which is attributed to it by the responsible individual
or organisation. Such bindings are the subject of ‘diplomatics’,
. . . the study of the Wesen [being] and Werden [becoming] of documentation, the analysis of genesis, inner constitution
and transmission of documents, and of their relationship with the facts represented in them and with their creators.
[9, p. 7]4
2 Many of us, as children, will have experimented with ‘hidden writing’ using, for instance, onion juice. More topically, developments in DNA proﬁling
(DNA LCN or DNA low copy number) allow evidence to be extracted from materials which previously were not thought to have suﬃcient cells for this [14].
3 A representation of this poem may be found at: http://www.luminarium.org/sevenlit/herbert/wings.htm.
4 Duranti is quoting Giorgio Cencetti, “La Preparazione dell’Archivista” in Antologia di Scritti Archivistici, ed. Romualdo Giuffrida (Roma: Ministero per i
beni culturali e ambientali. Publicazioni degli Archivi di Stato, 1985), p. 285.
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Originally conﬁned to juridical documents with necessarily unambiguous form and structure, ‘diplomatics’ has come to
have a much wider application which still implies a set of all embracing rules. For this reason we prefer to use the less
prescriptive term ‘binding’. In the analogue, bindings were obvious manifestations: the letters from a lover bound together
with a garter, a bundle of receipts neatly docketed and tied with lawyer’s tape, a label attached to a museum exhibit, an
album of photographs or a royal charter with the great seal attached by silken cord. All these disparate examples embody
intentions and implicit or explicit rules and relationships that can be described as ‘grammar’ in much the same way as the
syntax employed in the resource description framework (RDF) is described. The process of attaching a royal seal or a label
to a museum object is explicit and surrounded by formal process, whereas tying a lover’s letter in a bundle to deﬁne their
physical relationship may be equally digniﬁed but is implicit. If the seal or label becomes detached or the garter is not
retied then the value derived from the binding is lost.
The grammar of binding in the analogue is complex and represents centuries of accumulated experience and technolo-
gies. A letter has a form and process that dates back hundreds of years, which like all other information objects is always
viewed in the present through the lens of available technology: the quill pen, the camera, the typewriter, the PC and so
on [24]. We were taught at school or in the Brownies how a letter should be laid out, with at the top the addresses of the
sender and recipient along with the date, appropriate salutation (Dear Sir, My Love and so on), valediction (I remain your
Lordship’s humble servant, yours sincerely and so on), and the name and oﬃce, where appropriate, of the writer. If you are
of our sort of generation, you learned to do this with a pen, even a dip pen, and ink on a piece of paper and woe betide
you if you made splodges. From at least the seventeenth century there were guidebooks not just about the physical activity
of writing itself and the layout of letters, but also about the appropriate style of language and vocabulary to be used in
different contexts [26].
Letters were ﬁnally authenticated with the sender’s signature—a signature which can take a variety of forms depending
on the nature of the contents, and is extremely diﬃcult to forge. Where a letter was written out by a scribe, the author
would conventionally endorse a signature with the initials mp—that stands for the Latin tag ‘manu propria’—signed in his
own hand. If the writer did not sign it then the scribe would write pp (standing for the Latin tag per procurationem—through
the agency of) before his/her signature. If the author could not write then a mark was made that was attested by the scribe.
Where a letter or document required greater validation, signatures could be supported by seals or by witnesses. Letters
were often closed with the wax seal of the sender or the sender’s oﬃce providing further validation and security that after
the introduction of postal services was supported externally by franking to indicate the place and time of despatch. The
evolution of pre-gummed envelopes in the mid-nineteenth century obviated the need for sealing. To provide even stronger
binding, important documents that have a legal function (a will or a contract or a land transaction for example) can be
registered externally with an individual or organisation with juridical authority, such as a notary or the courts themselves,
in which case they were expected to respect particular forms that became the focus of ‘diplomatic’ study. Such registration
was often made explicit in the text of the document or through endorsements such as notorial marks or an indication that
duty had been paid for registration.
4. Migration to the digital
With the migration to the digital, several things have happened that combine to disturb this relationship which de-
pended on an equilibrium between content and context built up in the analogue over thousands of years, recognising the
‘profound signiﬁcance of communicative stability’.5 This context is culturally speciﬁc, reﬂecting different epistemologies and
circumstances. We will suggest that this disruption may have signiﬁcant consequences for social interactions. Financial infor-
mation systems were amongst the earliest to be migrated, a process that predated the introduction of electronic computers.
One consequence was that instead of transactions being registered in a hierarchy of records, that built for example the
balance sheet and proﬁt and loss account incrementally, they were registered as individual entities that could be linked to
others through complex references that the software could interpret to generate different aggregations for different report-
ing purposes. Although they were still bound into a collection—essential for audit purposes, the collection itself lacked the
formal and familiar hierarchical structures of the analogue and just subsisted in a database of individual transactions, in
other words the ‘functional equivalence’ of the analogue [8, p. 80]. It is simple to attribute this lack of structure to technical
convenience, but a more convincing explanation may be that the system built on the ideas of Luca Pacioli (1445–1517)
lacked his overall theoretical constructs that extended far beyond accounting to embrace the relationship of ‘proportion’ to
religion, medicine, law, architecture, grammar, printing, sculpture, music and all the liberal arts. Remarkably the terms that
Pacioli conceived in his Devina Proportiona are still used by the ﬁlm industry to this day [38, p. 60].
When word processing became commonplace with the introduction of the personal computer in the 1980s, other types
of documentation, particularly correspondence ceased to observe the form and structure of the analogue, and their rela-
tionships often ceased to be made explicit within their form. It was assumed incorrectly that the headers and footers of an
e-mail provided externally in the manner of a letterhead would be suﬃcient identiﬁcation, even though as most of us know
5 As emphasised by David Levy ‘The ability to keep talk ﬁxed, to guarantee its repeatability, has become an essential cornerstone of human social
organisations’ [23].
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hotel letterheads and used quite legitimately other people’s e-mail accounts or used our business accounts for private trans-
actions. As a result the roles of senders and recipients became confused to any other than the parties to a transaction and
even to them might not be immediately obvious. In the analogue, ‘Hi Michael’ implies a degree of informality that does not
appear to be the case of, for example, e-mail where perfect strangers often adopt this form of salutation. It would be naïve
to suggest that such a change is entirely a reﬂection of the migration to the digital. Styles of writing reﬂect social behaviour
and are dynamic. The use of the valediction ‘I remain your obedient servant’ had become archaic long before the introduc-
tion of the PC. What the migration to the digital appears to have done is to accelerate the process. The recent emergence of
social networks, exposed to search engines with global reach, like ﬁnancial systems, raze epistemic hierarchies, and in turn
reverse McLuhan’s [25, p. 46] claim that ‘it is the accumulation of group pressures and irritations that prompt invention
and innovation as counter-irritants’. Innovation now appears to be exaptive, rather than an outcome of interactions within
epistemic communities, suggesting a disjunction. Companies like Amazon.com say to us “Here it is, do with it as you please,
but we will watch you and give you extensions and other products that we judge match your expectations”. It is here that
technodeterminism is clearly at work.
The ﬂattening of epistemic hierarchies is not just a consequence of the interactions within social networks, but of the
way in which information is both aggregated and discovered. Digital objects that are not captured as part of a formal
process of audit (pretty much anything other than records of ﬁnancial transactions or those required to satisfy regulation)
have come to be only loosely bound, if at all, into a collection even in an organisational context. They are often held in
so-called ‘ﬁles’ on PCs or in individuals’ email boxes with no indication as to how they might relate to other documents
to form a collection. Together they can be described as a collection, but this would be a very contingent use of the term
that would cover the web pages that I happen to have open at any one time in a browser. Alarmingly this state of affairs
can apply to important documents, such as the emails of the Prime Minister, [27] as well as to those of private individuals.
Digital objects in effect become stand alone objects in an intellectual as well as a technical sense, randomly stored by
process and technology. When information is posted to social networks, this has even more profound implications for the
notion of a bounded collection and the bindings that attach the information to an individual. The collection that is Facebook
is much more porous and ﬂuid than an analogue equivalent with very loose binding processes. It can easily be taken out of
context or attributed through comment and links to other perhaps inappropriate contexts.
Taken together all these changes in practice consequent of an unthinking migration to the digital raise fundamental
questions about the nature of individual identity in the digital world where virtual devils and angels abound in an almost
medieval cosmology. This of necessity has important consequences when we seek to reference, authenticate or validate
information in the digital environment. This ‘digital marination’ troubles Tara Brabazon [5, p. 14], ‘Google has ﬂattened
expertise, creating confusion between ﬁnding information and possessing the literacy to evaluate and judge information. . .
My fear is not of wiki or Google. My concern is that in the confusion between ﬁnding information and building knowledge,
we lose not only the analogue objects and artefacts, but analogue ways of thinking. . . We have lost the capacity to value
the particular, the unique, the ephemeral and the transitory’. In other words individual identity not just of objects, but the
users of objects, themselves, are being submerged in an undifferentiated morass.
5. The abstract object and the stored bit pattern
If we consider a digital ‘object’, what we are generally interested in is the picture, the document, the song, the ﬁlm,
and so on, all of which we can call abiding verities. We only become interested in the actual bit pattern when there are
questions around whether or not the item is what was seen or heard before, deposited, exchanged between parties, and so
on—in other words doubts about authenticity. In many circumstances we are trying to get technology to provide an answer
to a question that is not philosophically a technological question, at least not in the strict sense of the word [31, p. 70].
The reason that we do this is because dates and times on ﬁles, number of bytes, and other data that is generated ‘on the
ﬂy’ are very easy to ﬁnd out and compare and provide what appear to be straight-forward, unequivocal ‘black and white’
answers to what are complex issues that have troubled jurists at least since the sixteenth century when the Donations of
Constantine were discovered to be a forgery [33, Chapter IV]. We make the assumption that if the bits are the same then
the identity is the same and that all changes to the bits constitute changes of substance. Neither of these assumptions is
wholly reliable, in exactly the same way that the shape and form of a physical document is not an entirely reliable guide to
either veracity or forgery.
We argued in our earlier article, ‘Digital Identity Matters’, [1] that when the same bit pattern is sent through the render-
ing mechanisms on two computers, there are many ways in which the perceived result may be different—thus making the
ﬁrst assumption unreliable. As a relatively trivial but common example of the second case, some copying processes change
the date and time on a ﬁle (information that is stored in the ﬁle itself), and by so doing change the bit pattern stored.
Many software environments treat date and time stamps (date created, date last modiﬁed, date accessed and date printed)
in a far from robust way, making reliance on the stored bit pattern as a surrogate for identity problematic. However, this
does not mean they do not have reference. We can observe the same phenomena in legal documents in the physical world
where the date and time is often the termination or ﬁling of a process rather than the date of its origination. For example,
a will may be drawn up and witnessed long before death and only registered with the appropriate authorities some time
after death.
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identity? This question is deceptive. In the analogue world changing the title of an object can have profound consequences.
Suppose the portrait of the Mona Lisa was in fact that of Thelma Arbuthnot or using a digital analogy an arbitrary allocation
such as WPM$5467, or that Shakespeare’s play Hamlet was really called ‘Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are dead’. This takes
us into the deep waters of the relationship of naming conventions to objects in the analogue which have been explored by
Barthes [4] and Sontag [37] amongst others in relation to images, and which we will develop in the digital context.
6. Rendition
In ‘Digital Identity Matters’ [1, p. 367] we indicated that the language of types and tokens is common within the dis-
course of aesthetics [40] and it is from this domain that we developed our discussion.
“The type/token distinction has been utilised in order to distinguish art forms with ‘unique’ objects, for example, sculp-
ture and painting, from those where there is no single unique object, for example, a play or a piece of music that will
have a multiplicity of performances. When we speak of Raoul Dufy’s Trouville we refer to his 1907 composition using oil
on canvas and not to any of the many reproductions of the work. It is unique, even if it does change over time due to
deterioration of the paint or restoration, the type from which the tokens or reproductions are derived. But the situation
is not always this straightforward. To begin with, types and tokens are slippery characters that are not forever ﬁxed as
either type or token; thus a token can become a type, and we might say of Nina Simone’s rendition of Feeling Good
that it is the deﬁnitive version and that any other rendition is a token of that type. Secondly, we are not always dealing
with physically unique objects, Schubert’s Unﬁnished Symphony is not a physical object, though we may want to argue
that the original score is a physical manifestation of it; and ﬁnally, we can see that the usual mental/physical divisions
that we use to categorise ‘objects’ are not always clearly appropriate when we talk of performances or a digital image of
something, perhaps, Lara Croft, in virtual space.”6
The experience that we have of any digital object is not a direct sensory experience of the object itself, but a performance
choreographed by a combination of hardware and software, ﬁne-tuned by the settings on the computer in question and the
idiosyncrasies of computer, monitor and so forth. That being the case, what each of us experiences in relation to a particular
bit pattern will probably be different, but does that mean that the experience of one of us is ‘authentic’ whilst the others are
being subjected to an inferior imitation? If this were the case, it would make the sharing of digital objects very problematic
indeed and the presentation of any digital object as evidence in court impossible. Manifestly, people share digital objects
frequently and, for much of the time, do not suffer from this problem, even though the email that is sent by one of us to
the others is ‘experienced’ differently in the different computing environments that we all use. Clearly what is important to
us is the ‘content’ of the digital object, be that an email, a draft of this paper, a music track or a digital photograph.
In the analogue paper world, we developed ‘ﬁlters’ of varying sophistication, depending on the context, to determine
what was important in relation to authenticity and what was not. The fact that we are able to accept a difference in the
‘performance’ of digital objects on different systems suggests that we have begun to develop ‘ﬁlters’ for digital information
objects. A major problem is that, for most of us, the grammar of these ﬁlters is not well developed and this produces an
opportunity for fraudsters who exploit the fact that, in the on-line world, they can draw together elements from the web
sites of ﬁnancial institutions and combine them with material of their own to produce digital ‘performances’ that appear to
be authentic requests for security information, but are in fact ‘phishing’ scams, a topic that we will return to later.7 Such
ﬁltering is beyond the boundary of ‘diplomatic’ and needs to be considered within the framework of the interpretation of
the ‘bindings’ that together enable ‘truth enframing’.
A further issue is that many performances in the digital world are based on dynamic assembly of information in response
to the individual request. The Wikipedia article referred to in the previous paragraph will probably be different from that
which is available to us at the time of writing by the time that this article appears in print. It will probably be different
again if you look at it in another three months time. A more dynamic example of this scenario exists when a Google search
is carried out, where the results returned change from minute to minute and so an instruction to ‘carry out a Google8
search for the words “digital performance” and then follow the link in the third item returned’ is meaningless as there
is little ﬁxity in the object that is the result of the search. This example, if repeated across searches via search engines,
databases and on-line forms, requires us to separate the identity of the query from the identity of the result returned; the
former may have a ﬁxity, whilst the latter may be unique to each search.
7. Divergence of versions
One of the important advantages of digital representation over analogue is the ease with which objects can be changed.
However, it also presents a considerable challenge to the notion of identity that we use to determine and re-identify an
6 A description of this computer game character can be found at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lara_Croft.
7 For a more detailed description of phishing, see for instance the Wikipedia article at http://www.wikipedia.com/phishing/.
8 http://www.google.com/.
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98, 99]. This isn’t necessarily an issue of a plurality of meanings that we have already referred to, though it is true that some
changes can produce devastating alterations in meaning: for example, the omission of ‘not’ in Terence’s phrase “Nothing is
said that has not been said before.”, or the mistranscription of ‘l’ in ‘life’ to an ‘f’ in “Nothing in life is promised except
death.”, which would surely give rise to a population shift in Scotland. Perhaps we should ask if any and every change that
an object undergoes represents an identity change and, if so, how do we effectively link together chains of modiﬁcation
and amendment into a meta-level identity which permits the relationships to be characterised in a such a way that we can
trace a document’s progress as being D at time 1 (D at T 1) and D at time n (D at Tn)? If we remain for a moment in
the analogue world and consider the changes that exist between the early and later versions of The Waste Land,9 it would
be hard to identify them as the same object, unless under some less than rigorous, adaptive notion of identity.10 Perhaps
a notion of an intransitive relation, of the kind suggested by Russell [32], in which x stands in relation R to y, y stands
in relation R to z, but the relation xRz is excluded, that is, (xRy & yRz) → ¬xRz might do, though it is very strong and a
weaker version, where the relation xRz is not explicitly excluded and (xRy & yRz) → ¬xRz is not implied, is more likely to
be useful in this and the class of similar problems we are likely to encounter.
The notions of identity, equivalence, transitivity and intransitivity are all important in a digital context because bit
patterns may be rendered in any number of ways without it being clear that the same bit pattern persists, or that it
is a different pattern of bits that is now being made to appear as a previous but quite distinct pattern once did. Their
representation by itself is insuﬃcient to establish their identity or discernibility. Once again we ﬁnd ourselves concerned
with how the identity conditions for one object with another can fail to be met at the level of the bit pattern, whilst
remaining to be met at the level of representation or appearance [1].
With a domain of bit patterns D , which can be mapped using the action of the technology b, onto a range of representa-
tions R , we get the statement: b : D → R . If we now deﬁne equivalence as x ∼ x′ iff b(x) = b(x′), then x′ ≈ x, where x, x′ ∈ D
must also be equivalent and thus both symmetric and transitive.
However, when bit pattern x is acted upon to produce bx, we have y and not x. We can express this as x → bx = y,
and having gone through this transformation we now ﬁnd that to regain x by b−1 would be impossible since b−1 no longer
exists. There is no way to go back to the previous state of x from where we are now. The relationship is asymmetrical and
intransitive, and it would be clearly false to say of y that it is equivalent to x, for there are no conditions under which
we could effect y in any way so as to produce x, but also, under our deﬁnition of equivalence, x and y would have to be
members of the same domain, and they are not.
There is no inverse of b. If there were some function c which maps R to D such that c(b(x)) ∼ x, it would not imply
that c(b(x)) = x. This leaves us with a very curious state of affairs because c is not an inverse of b; it cannot take us back to
the bit pattern x. Which is to say that, as long as the set of equivalent bit patterns has more than one member, the inverse
function of b will not be unique; the best you can do is ﬁnd a function c which maps R to D to give you something that is
equivalent to the original x, though not—except by some extraordinary chance—identical to it.
If we introduce the set (domain) of stylesheets (S), we can begin to see the complexity of the situation a little more
clearly. If b : D, S → R ,11 then b(x, s1) → r1 ∈ R , b(x, s2) → r2 ∈ R , and so on. Which, even if it did entail that x ∼ x′ iff
b(x, s1) = b(x′, s1) would not necessarily entail that x ∼ x′ is b(x, s2) = b(x′, s2).
This state of affairs is not simply of academic interest. If digital objects lack ﬁxity in addition to being easily tampered
with, how can they be used as transactional evidence and what becomes of the bindings and associate ﬁlters familiar in the
analogue world?
8. Technical transformations
Technical processes are applied to digital bit patterns to transform them into different ones. Our interest is in (i) those
that operate at a technical level on the bit patterns and are agnostic about what sort of object it is, and (ii) those that work
on the intellectual content of the object. So, there are two sorts of transformations to consider:
• one-way, non-reversible transformations that produce a pseudo-identity which is related in a deﬁned way to the original
bit pattern;
• two-way, reversible transformations that produce an object that, following the reverse transformation, restore the orig-
inal bit pattern.
8.1. One-way transformations
These are used to produce a ‘simpliﬁed’ object that can be used for some purposes in place of the original. An example
of a technical transformation is a checksum or a hash. These can be used as a mechanism to detect technical difference
9 A rendition of this poem may be found at: http://www.bartleby.com/201/1.html.
10 One of the tragedies of the digital representation and facility for change is the loss of a substantial record of amendments and revisions of the sort we
have, for example, in Pound’s work with Eliot all the way through the writing of The Waste Land.
11 This would more often be written as b : D ⊗ S → R .
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more aspects of identity and can be used to verify technical identity without engaging with the intellectual identity of the
object. An example is that law enforcement agencies and employers can use lists of hashes of known child pornography
objects to screen systems rapidly in order to determine whether or not such objects are present. This does not involve a
human agent being required to view such material at the screening stage. The hash provides a surrogate for the identity
of the ﬁle. An example of an ‘intellectual’ transformation is a transformation of a media ﬁle that results in some loss
of information by reducing the resolution of an image or the sampling rate of a sound ﬁle. In both cases the result is
identiﬁably the same picture or song, but the non-reversible transformation has resulted in the discard of some of the
information content. Migration of digital ﬁles from one format to another frequently involves this type of transformation
and is likely to be a feature of migration strategies used as part of digital preservation activities [16, pp. 91–95], [30].
8.2. Two-way transformations
One important use of these is to produce a different object to hide the identity of the original from people and/or
systems. This type of transformation is usually referred to as encryption and is widely used by governments, individuals and
in commerce. What is the relationship between the original bit pattern, the intellectual identity and the encrypted one?
Clearly the encrypted identity is not suﬃcient for recovery of the unencrypted one in that an additional key is required for
recovery, and organisations and individuals often ﬁnd out to their cost that without the key, they do not effectively have
the intellectual objects.
Ideally digital preservation transformations would be of this type, but new formats are rarely simply supersets of existing
ones, rather they are better considered as more or less closely overlapping sets. Manually checking that no corruption or
data loss had occurred would be impossible and, as we have seen, cross checking automatically with the original could also
not be guaranteed.
9. Composites
In the discussion of Divergence of Versions and Transformations above, we deal with one area where the identity of an
information object can be problematic but which, as we have seen, presents similar diﬃculties in both the analogue and
digital domains, except that in the latter it may leave little or no trace. We now turn to an issue that presents increasing
diﬃculties in the digital world, as tools are produced that facilitate it and technological developments blur the distinctions:
composite objects. At its simplest this involves combining two existing texts to make a larger one, but the ﬂexibility and
creative possibility offered by digital representation extends this into a wide variety of ﬁelds and in particular written texts
(the boundedness of which can be very ﬂuid through hyperlinks), composite images (easily modiﬁed with such tools as
Photoshop12 and Gimp13) and digital objects where one intellectual object is hidden within another.
Combining sources of information in a variety of ways such as through referencing and footnotes has long made the
boundary of an information object slightly blurred. In an earlier paper we pointed out that:
“hypertext is an obvious way in which the bounds of digital objects become eroded, however it is not a concept that
originated in the digital world. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, written in the trenches and ﬁrst published in
1922, uses a nesting of levels of argument that provide a linking pattern that can be traced by the reader”. [6]
The hypertext world of the Web facilitates links and the seamless inclusion of intellectual entities from one source into
another. The resulting composite has an identity of its own. The possibility of making one information object very similar
to another by replicating most of one object with a few ‘minor’ changes allows those intent on fraud or deception all the
scope they desire. We regularly receive e-mails from individuals or organisations attempting to obtain our bank security
details via phishing attacks—using ‘composite’ web pages composed of material from a variety of sites including the ‘real’
bank web site—that are intended to convince bank customers to divulge their security details. Most of the links and images
on such composite web pages point to the real bank site and only a small number of page elements are actually provided
by the fraudsters in order to harvest personal details. Increasingly such phishing expeditions appear to be authentic, but the
content is not valid in much the same way as a forged charter produced in a medieval monastery is not authentic.
An important issue here is the intention to deceive. The artist Alison Jackson produces fake composite photographs of
well known people in order to raise questions about whether or not the public perception of such ﬁgures has any basis in
reality:14
“Hardly anyone knew Diana. Yet on her death the world mourned. They did not mourn the woman, but her photographic
image. We all think we know David Beckham; thousands of fans have seen him in ﬂesh on the pitch, but millions of
12 http://www.adobe.com/products/photoshop/index.html.
13 http://www.gimp.org.
14 For an overview of Jackson’s work, see http://www.guardian.co.uk/weekend/story/0,,1075094,00.html.
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Blair. The result is that the photograph becomes more real than the actual person or event. In my work I use celebrity
look-alikes to create images which pose fundamental questions about where the truth ends and the lies begin. The line
between what is real and what is fantasy has never been more blurred. My photographs seek to explore the gap between
the two and, if only for a second, bring it sharply into focus”. [19]
In doing so she claims that she does not set out to deceive. On the other hand, in his article on detecting fake digital
photographs, Hany Farid describes the impact of digital tampering and the development of mathematical and computational
algorithms to expose digital fakes, a task that becomes necessary when there is an explicit intention to deceive or fabricate
[11].15 These are compelling examples of what we are getting at in the discussion of relationship between the intellectual
and technical that we described as techné. A technical analysis would draw no distinction between Jackson’s rationale for
her work and that of a fraudster.
We can develop this line of thought further. The question as to whether or not a manufactured image depicting child
sexual abuse or, perhaps slightly less emotively, consensual pornography which depicts something that has never happened
are equivalent to images (doctored or otherwise) of abuse or pornography that have taken place raises interesting intentional
and legal issues. The approach to this is not the same in all jurisdictions, a complicating factor that applies more generally
to much of this discussion and by its very nature is dynamic.16 In such circumstances it is important to distinguish between
‘real’ (undoctored) and manufactured images and the extent to which such processes have taken place would perhaps have
to rely largely on the technical attributes of the digital objects themselves rather than intellectual identity. The techniques
discussed by Farid [11] are important in this situation, but a doctored image is not the same as a completely ‘ﬁctitious’ one,
since in the ﬁrst case the person exists but in the second they may not; just like the difference between Jackson’s intention
and fraud, this can only be distinguished intellectually and not mechanistically.
Computing systems can create a view that is dynamically based on a search of a database which may produce, for the
user, an ‘object’ that has never been viewed before and will never be viewed again. We see a particular instantiation of this
experience in the inclusion of ‘personalised’ advertisements as part of the page when a user visits a web site. These adver-
tisements are selected as a result of earlier pages visited and cookies left in the browser. Pages viewed will be different for
different users, because although the main content is the same, the advertisements are not. The LOCKSS (‘Lots of Copies Keep
Stuff Safe’) system, developed at Stanford University17 to capture and archive e-journals, has to distinguish journal content
from ephemeral material such as advertisements, site navigation and branding. This is achieved by constructing technical
ﬁlters known as ‘plug-ins’ that have to be programmed to identify the ‘intellectual content’ of the journal for preservation
purposes. Initially such ﬁlters must be deﬁned manually, based on the speciﬁc requirements of e-journal archiving and the
features of the particular e-journal publisher’s web site.
A further twist in this discussion of composite information objects is the capability to encode one intellectual entity in
another as in the case of steganography where, for example, credit card details can be encoded within a digital photograph
(or other type of content) that is only detectable with a decoding programme. This illustrates the idea that an information
object is viewed through the ‘lens of available technology’. A digital object viewed with simple tools (or settings) may be
perceived to have a different information content than the same object viewed with a more sophisticated set of tools in
the same ways as the DNA LCN example. This means that the same digital object may have different meaning for different
people or at different times.
10. Where does this lead us?
Just like the pungent smell of a red herring, technology is beguiling to those who have a liking for the chimera of wood
smoke rather than what in the ﬁrst place made the wood, or the ﬁsh, and their respective aetiologies. We have argued
that it is not simply that technology should not dictate the approach taken to the solution of identity but that it cannot.
Technology per se does not entail even the possibility of truth-framing which we deem necessary for the determination
of, those very problematic notions of, authenticity and validation—notions that must be ﬁt for a particular purpose and
determined by the user. Persistent identiﬁers, for example, are persistent only in their mode of social use and cannot be
adopted as a technological solution, even if one were advisable.
15 A range of examples of images doctored for a variety of purposes may be found at Farid’s web site at: http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/farid/research/
digitaltampering/.
16 The 1996 US Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA) extended the existing federal criminal laws against child pornography to include certain types
of “virtual porn”. In 2002, hearing Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the United States Supreme Court found that portions of the CPPA, being overly broad
and restrictive, violated First Amendment rights. The Court ruled that images containing an actual minor or portions of a minor are not protected, while
computer-generated images depicting a ﬁctitious minor are constitutionally protected. In the UK however, under the Protection of Children Act 1978, as
amended by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, a pseudo-photograph of a child is deﬁned as an image, whether made by computer graphics
or otherwise. Possession or creation of such an image is, therefore, illegal.
17 http://www.lockss.org/.
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In one current view, objects are at least in part socially constructed; they are bounded and stabilized through social
interaction (Smith 1996 [36]). Literary works (e.g., Hamlet) are a clear example of this. Although we cannot really say
what works are, we have nonetheless created a cultural mechanism (copyright and the courts) to help us decide where
the boundaries between works lie. Here there can be no question of ultimate, natural answers—only social answers based
on law and politics. [22]
Whilst few writers make a strong assertion that identity is purely a technical issue, some do by either omission or
implication or, as in the case of Negroponte, both.18 Much discussion around the use of both digital signatures and persistent
identities sounds rather techno-deterministic [12].19 In summarising discussions on Authenticity in a Digital Environment in
2000 at the Council on Library and Information Resources, Abby Smith used this description in relation to using Public Key
Infrastructures as the answer:
To devise technical solutions to what is essentially a social challenge is to engender an “arms race” among hackers and
their police. [35]
Although a brand is applied using a technology, such as a hot brand iron, the mark itself is nothing more than a social
construct. Even if biometrics as a brand are collected, these only support a socially agreed identiﬁer, a personal name. The
inevitable consequence of the adoption of an arbitrary reference, one not concerned with the preservation of the intellectual
content, will be an under-application of pra¯xis and potentially a failure in binding.
If, as we claim, technology does not provide the answer to identity problems, then we need to look at how these cultural
mechanisms or social practices provide us with a way forward. One way of doing this is to look backward at the analogue
world with which we are all rather more familiar, at the practices that have built up around the storage of information
just as pigment marks on paper have developed over several hundred years. In this matter we are preceded by almost a
millennium in the science of diplomatics that was developed in response to the widespread forging of documents in the
Middle Ages.20
Authenticity in the paper world is about much more than the technology that represents the document, it is about the
structure, form, content and context of the document. In the digital world it is the same, but we have yet to establish many
of the social practices and conventions that are required to deal with the distinct lack of ﬁxity in such a world. Records
management has much to teach us in relation to veriﬁable reference through ﬁle plans that are external to the document,
retention periods and ﬁle registries. These are all social practices that organisations have simply abandoned in the digital
world as unnecessary, but roles and responsibilities for particular actions and practices are an important part of establishing
a digital order where there is veriﬁable identity and Duranti [9] is right to say that we have much to learn, in this respect,
from the past.
As we have seen, there can be no guarantee that the intellectual content will be maintained if we rely entirely on
technological referents without any consideration of the sense of the text and its reference in their particular contexts. For
this reason we must learn from known practice and procedure in the analogue world with its well-deﬁned rules that make
binding an explicit consequence. Such an approach directly addresses the notion that identity of the object, no matter what
the object’s format, is dynamic with changes that can be mapped in the form of intransitive relations at every stage of its
persistence and relationships, which may or may not be intransitive.21
To pervert John Donne ‘no document is an island’22 or as Day puts it ‘information is not neutral and not without ex-
pression; information is produced by a relation of bodies in and as space’ [7]. Content must not be dismissed in favour of
technology since technology can never resolve the semantics of dynamic relationships. The intellectual contents of docu-
ments can change over time without there being any necessary change in the technology used to render them. For example,
the deﬁnition of the term ‘bill of rights’ in a stable print culture has changed repeatedly since it was coined in the late
eighteenth century. There can be changes of technology which do not necessitate corresponding changes of content, for
example, from writing to printing or from analogue to digital photography. However since it is content that is our fun-
damental concern, we must not concentrate on technology-driven solutions at the expense of the only thing about which
questions of truth and validity are apt. Printing and the Internet make it possible to provide greater access to knowledge,
but they do nothing to resolve the fundamental questions that depend on intellectual endeavour. Johann Gutenburg may
18 In Being Digital Negroponte talks a great deal about technology but does not discuss the identity of the objects except in describing bits as ‘The DNA of
Information’, which is to adopt a very techno-representational perspective [29].
19 Contrast, for example, Sign here!: handwriting in the age of the new media [28], with the Wikipedia entry on digital signature at: http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Digital_signature, the report commissioned by the Nation Library of Australia at: http://www.nla.gov.au/nla/staffpaper/2001/dack.html, or the report on
the DCC Workshop on Persistent Identiﬁers available at: http://www.ariadne.ac.uk/issue44/dcc-pi-rpt/.
20 A very good account of the history of diplomatics can be found in the Encyclopaedia Britannica Online article by, the very well-regarded, Peter
Herde [17].
21 We can observe this clearly in a family photograph album where the identity of the subjects remain stable but their reference changes, mothers become
grandmothers and daughters become aunts or even great aunts and so on.
22 John Donne—from Devotions upon emergent occasions (1623).
544 J.E.P. Currall et al. / Journal of Applied Logic 6 (2008) 534–544have contributed to the great religious upheaval of the sixteenth century known as the Reformation, but he did not cause
it; no more did Tim Berners-Lee cause globalisation.
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